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Abstract  Largely ignored by previous studies  is the
public  goods  dimension  of agricultural  en-
The adoption of multiphase electric power  ergy inputs which necessitates  some  type of
for electric  irrigation  has been limited  in an  public  or  collective  choice.  When  produc-
area  characterized  by  extremely  rapid  ex-  tion  or  consumption  of a  particular  energy
pansion of irrigated  acreage  despite produc-  source  requires  collective  effort,  conven-
tion  cost  advantages.  Theoretical  and  tional  market  mechanisms  are  often  inade-
empirical  evidence  of failure in the existing  quate  for  allocating  such  energy  supplies.
market  for  multiphase  power  development  When such  market failure exists,  non-market
are  presented.  Alternative  development  alternatives  can  be  used  to  allocate  energy
mechanisms  are  presented  and  discussed.  resources.
Key words: multiphase  power development,  A particular area of agricultural energy with
market  failure,  irrigation,  en-  public goods dimensions is the development
ergy.  of multiphase  (three-phase)  electric  power
and  its  use  for  agricultural  irrigation.  A1- Recent instabilities in energy supplies and  and  its  use  for  agricultural  irrigation.  Al-
prices  have  generated  a  need  fo  ener  rgy re-  though single phase power is adequately dis- prices  have  generated  a  need for  energy  re-  tributed  in  rural  Georgia  by  electric
lated research in agriculture.  In recent years,
agricultural  scientists  have  studied  energy  membership  cooperatives  (EMC's),  multi-
needs and efficiency in food production  (De-  phase power is necessary for the large horse-
bertin and Pagoulatos; Tyner; Holland),  food  power  electric  motors  that  are  required  by
processing (Broder and Booth; Jones and Lee)  most  irrigation  systems.  While  multiphase
and alternative  energy sources (Webb;  Hertz-  electricity  is  more  efficient  than  diesel fuel
mark  et  al.).  In  general,  these  studies  ap-  i  irrigation,  its  development  and  use  has
proached  agricultural  energy  as  a private  or  been  limited  despite  these  cost  advantages.
incompatible  use  good  which  has  low  ex-  The  objectives  of this  paper  are  to:  (1)  ex-
clusion costs and is readily allocated through  amine patterns of multiphase  electric  power
market  mechanisms.  Using  a  market  frame-  consumption  in  Georgia,  (2)  examine  evi-
work,  these  studies  have  predicted  the  im-  dence  of market  failure  in existing  markets
pacts  of energy policies  and  price  changes  for  multiphase  power  development,  (3)  es-
on  food  production,  processing,  and  con-  timate production  efficiency losses from mar-
sumption.  ket  failure,  and  (4)  discuss  non-market
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1  Recently,  mechanical  multiphase  converters  have  been  developed which  allow  some  substitution  of single
phase for multiphase  power. The cost of these converters  is highly variable and depends on the specific application.
The  initial  purchase  cost  range  of  $5,000  to  $20,000  is  below  average  multiphase  line  construction  costs  and
may  potentially  reduce  the  demand  for  multiphase  power development  by some  remote  or isolated  consumers.
However,  use  of these  converters  involves  other  costs  which  have  discouraged  their  adoption.  Specifically,  a
separate  converter  must be  purchased  for  each  new application  and the  user  is  responsible  for  maintaining  and
servicing these converters. Hence,  for large  diversified operations,  the development  of multiphase  power is thought
to be economically  superior to  these converters  in the  long run.
57alternatives for developing multiphase power  exclusion and rivalry in consumption,  a con-
for agricultural  irrigation.  sumer  simply purchases  additional  amounts
until  an  optimum  is  achieved.
THEORETICAL  FRAMEWORK  For  public  goods,  if  one  individual  vol-
untarily provides the good, others may enjoy
Multiphase electric power development can  the  goo  thout payment or for a  nominal
benalzedin  puli  god  fra  k  the  good without  payment  or for  a  nominal
be  oanalyzed  in  a  public  goods  framework,  fee.  Initial  customers  create  positive  exter-
The two key elements of a pure  public good
nonexclusiveness  in  nalities  for future  customers  who cannot  be
include  nonrivalry  and nonexsiveess in  excluded  from consumption.  Voluntary  con-
consumption  (Randall).  Nonrivalry  results  tributions  from these subsequent consumers
when the marginal cost of an additional user  uneri  e  s  consumers are  uncertain  since  some  consumers  under-
of a public  good  is  zero or  when the  good  their true demands  for the good  in
is joint  impact  in nature  (Schmid).  Nonex-  hopes of enjoying the good without payment
clusiveness  or  high  exclusion  costs  result  cl  s  or  hh  e  n  cs  ret  or for a nominal fee. Unless collective activity
when exclusion of potential customers is not  is  successful  in  extracting  the  appropriate
feasible  (Musgrave;  Samuelson).  The  use  of  payment  from  each  customer, the  level  of
the  term "public"  refers  only to the nature  the p  c  oo  pro  the  group as a
of consumption  and  does  not  prescribe  the  the  public  good  provided  by  the  group  as  a
of consumption  and  does  notprescribe  the  whole is likely to be below the optimal level.
nature  of the  producer  (Bish). nature  of the  ecproducer  (Bish).  . The  underprovision  of public  goods by pri-
Multiphase  electric  power development is  mechanisms  is  herein  referred
vate  market  mechanisms  is  herein  referred
characterized  by both nonrivalry  and nonex-  a  "market  failure
clusiveness.  Nonrivalry  refers  to  the  rela-  illurae  e  ial  lel 
tionship  between  users  when  an  additional  Figure  1  illustrates  the  optimal  level  and
tionship  between  users when  an  additional  marginal  prices  of multiphase  power devel-
multiphase  power  user  is  connected  to  an  opment  with  public  good  characteristics
existing  multiphase  line.  Once  the lines are  ih  p  2  he demnd schedules DI Dc
constructed,  an  additional  user  has little  ef-  is  p  2  he  demand s  ul
and D3 illustrate the demand for multiphase
fect  on  the  availability  of power  to  other  ad D3 istrate  e  dendividu  als.The  de
customers.  Hen,  n  r  impower  by three different individuals.  The de-
customers. Hence,  nonrivalry is embodied in  mand schedule  PG  is  a  vertical  summation
(multi-  mand  schedule  PG  is  a  vertical  summation
the physical  properties  of  the good  (multi-of the individual  demand  curves  and repre-
phase power)  and its method of distribution  sents aggregate  demand for the public good.
(power lines).
The nonexclusive properties of multiphase
power  derive  more  from  the  legal  environ-
ment rather  than  the  physical  properties  of
the good.  State  statutes prohibit  EMC's from
charging differential rates to agricultural cus-
tomers  along  a  multiphase  power  line,  re-
gardless  of  differences  in  customer  con-  Price
tributions to initial development costs. Once
a  line is built,  new multiphase  power  users
need only pay the marginal costs of bringing
the power from  existing multiphase  lines to
their  farms.  After  these  marginal  costs  are
paid,  exclusion  of  multiphase  power  cus-
tomers who have not contributed to the costs
of developing the initial or trunk multiphase
lines  is not possible.
The nonrivalry and nonexclusive  nature of
public  goods  creates  special  problems  for
allocating  resources  to  public goods.  These  P 4 —  MC
problems  are  best  illustrated  by comparing  PG
P3  ..  D3
the  allocative  process  between  public  and  p2  . . D3
private  goods.  The  optimal  level  of  con-  -
R  S  Public
sumption  of both  public  and  private  goods  R  S 
is  achieved where the marginal  cost is equal
to  the  individual  consumer's  marginal  ben-  Figure  1.  Multiphase  Power  Line  Construction  as
efit.  For  private  goods  characterized  by low  a Public Good.
58A vertical  instead  of a horizontal  summation  sented as evidence that: (1)  transactions costs
is appropriate  for a public good because the  exceed the benefits  of collective  action,  (2)
summed demand represents  the total amount  private markets for multiphase power  devel-
all  three  consumers  are  willing  to  pay  to  opment  have  failed,  and  (3)  multiphase
obtain a particular output which is available  power  development  may  require  supple-
to all potential users. For example,  the third  menting  private  market  mechanisms.
consumer  is  willing  to  obtain  output  R  at  The concept of market failure used  herein
price  P4 for his  use.  However,  at  that price  is descriptive  rather than prescriptive  in  na- the first and second consumers may consume  ture. In other words,  the existence of market
R  output  without  payment.  If  transactions  failure  is not sufficient  evidence  that a  non-
costs  are  zero,  the  three  consumers  could  market  alternative  is  either  superior  or  de-
achieve  net  gains  by  providing  output  S  sirable.  The  choice  of institutional  arrange-
through  collective activity.  At  S, the  sum of  ments  for  multiphase  power  development
their  marginal  evaluations  is  equal  to  the  must take into account the positive and neg- marginal  cost. The first consumer contributes  ative  distributional  consequences  of market
P,  to the cost of an additional unit of output  supplements. These market supplements and at level S and some  amount less than his total  their  distributional  consequences  are  ad-
benefits  (the  area  under  his  demand  curve  dressed  in this  paper.
up to S). In the presence of transactions costs,
uncertainties  and  strategic  bargaining  over  DATA
the financing  of the  intramarginal  units,  pri-
vate markets may fail to provide the optimal  The data used in this analysis were obtained
level  of the  public  good.  from a  survey of EMC's  in Georgia.  Georgia
The  example  given  illustrates  that the  ef-  has  42  EMC's  which  serve  in excess  of  72
fectiveness  of  collective  economic  activity  percent of the land area in the State and over
in  providing  an  optimal  level  of a  public  two million customers. The survey was mailed
good  is influenced  by  transactions  costs.  In  to the operating manager of each cooperative
a world of imperfect knowledge, transactions  in  September  1981.  Fifty-two  percent or  22
costs  take the  form of information,  contrac-  of the surveys were completed and returned.
tural,  and policing  costs  (Rogers;  Dahlman).  The  responding  cooperatives  represented
Identifying  and  informing  potential  benefi-  every  region  of  the  State  including  metro-
ciaries  of  collective  action  and  measuring  politan,  rural  agricultural,  and rural  non-ag-
individual demands involve information costs.  ricultural  areas.  However,  the  respondents
Reaching a collective agreement  and making  were concentrated in the southeast and south-
some collective bid involve contractural costs  west portions of the State. This area includes
while protecting  the  assets of collective  ac-  the dominant agricultural and irrigation areas
tion  involves  policing  costs.  When  transac-  of the  State.  The  majority  of  nonresponses
tion  costs  exceed  the  potential  gains  from  were in urban areas or nonagricultural  areas.
collective  action,  such  action  may  not  be  Thus, the problem of nonrespondent bias was
forthcoming  or  it may  be  less  than  optimal  thought  to  be  relatively  minor  in  this  ex-
(Dahlman).  ample.  The  respondents  provide  electric
Empirical  research on transactions  costs  is  service  to  338,394  residential,  13,152  in-
limited  due to the non-market and non-mon-  dustrial,  and  21,418 specifically  designated
etary components of such costs. Factors which  agricultural  customers.  The  average  coop-
influence  transactions  costs  and  the  ability  erative  served  approximately  17,000  total
for  groups  to  act  collectively  include:  (1)  customers with over 90 percent of these cus-
group  size,  (2)  the  degree  of member  par-  tomers  classified  as  residential.  A  summary
ticipation  (Buchanan  and Tullock),  (3)  dis-  of  the  information  obtained  from  the  re-
tribution  of member  preferences  (Kafoglis  spondents  is included  in tables  1 and  2.
and Cebula),  (4) personal and group wealth,  Information was also obtained in the survey
(5) potential gains from group participation,  on  interruptible  power  service,  which  is  a
and  (6)  sense of community  (Schmid).  relatively  new  option  service  for  Georgia
Relationships  between  the  above  charac-  electric  companies.  This  option  allows  a
teristics  and  transactions  costs  will  not  be  power  company  to  temporarily  disconnect
fully explored  in this  research.  Instead,  the  service  during  a  peak  use  load;  the  most
absence  of  collective  action  in  the  devel-  common contractural  interruptible period in opment  of  multiphase  power  will  be  pre-  Georgia  is between  4:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.
59TABLE  1.  MULTIPHASE  USERS  OF  ELECTRIC  MEMBERSHIP  Each  cooperative  reported  two  aspects  of
COOPERATIVES,  GEORGIA,  1981  construction costs. First, a total cost per mile
Customers  paid by the cooperative to the line construc-
Item  Residential  Industrial  Agricultural  tion firm  was  reported.  Second,  the portion
.............  Number  ...................  of  that  cost  actually  paid  by  the  customer
EMC'  offering  was reported.  For example,  one  cooperative
power  ..........  22  22  paid  $25,000 per mile to the  line construc-
Multiphase  cus-  tion  company  and a  customer  of  this  coop-
tomers  ..........  2,221  266
EMC's  offering  erative  paid  $25,000  per  mile  to  the
interruptible  cooperative.  In contrast, another cooperative
service'  ........ a  3  ____  o  ___  0  8  also paid  $25,000 per  mile to the  line con-
aThe  most  common  time  for  interrupted  service  was  struction  firm while  a  customer  of this  co-
from  4:00  p.m.  -8:00  p.m.  operative  paid only $15,000  per mile to the
In exchange  for this  potential  peak load  in-  cooperative for multiphase  line  installation.
terruption,  the  user receives  a  discount  on  A  lower  cost  cooperative,  one  that  paid
all power.  Discounts  available  on  this  type  $6,800 per mile for line installation, charged
of service  averaged  38 percent with a range  its  customer  the  full  costs  of  construction.
of 60 percent  to no discount.  Since this  op-  Other lower cost cooperatives did not charge
tion  could be  used in  most  irrigation  situa-  their  customers  for  multiphase  line  instal-
tions,  its potential  is analyzed  in this paper.  lation. While  some variation in costs of con-
struction would  be  expected,  the  variation
MARKET  FAILURE  IN  MULTIPHASE  in  charges  for  multiphase  power  indicates
POWER  DEVELOPMET  that  some  cooperatives  may  be  responding
All  of the respondents  offered  multiphase  to the externalities  and financing  the collec-
power  with  a  total  of  2,221  industrial  and  tive  aspects  of the power  development.
266  agricultural  customers  reported  in the  While a rigorous analysis of all factors which
survey.  A  parent  organization  provides  the  contribute  to market  failure  will  not be  at-
construction  service  of multiphase  line  for  tempted,  some  relationships  between  the
all  of the  EMC's  in  Georgia.  Construction  consumer  demand for multiphase power  de-
costs,  a  limiting factor in multiphase  devel-  velopment and  transactions  costs  can be  in-
opment, averaged $16,235 per mile although  ferred  from  the  data.2 Transactions  costs  of
the range  of these  costs was  from  $6,000 to  collective  action  such  as  information,  orga-
$25,000 per mile. Variations  in construction  nizational,  and bargaining  costs  among  cur-
costs were attributed to the following factors:  rent  and  future  users  reduce  the  effective
(1)  difficulty of terrain,  (2)  limited number  demand  of  individual  or  collective  action
of routings,  and  (3)  existing  territorial  bar-  (Rogers).  High  development  costs  and  high
riers such as county boundaries or city limits.  transactions  costs were  thought  to  be  asso-
TABLE  2.  DEVELOPMENT  COST  ON  MULTIPHASE  LINE  AND  ciated  with  low  effective  demand  for  such
DISCOUNTS  AVAILABLE  TO  INTERRUPTIBLE  POWER  USERS  OF  development.  Hence, the level of multiphase
ELECTRIC  MEMBERSHIP  COOPERATIVES,  GEORGIA,  1981 
power  development  in  an  area  should  be
Item__  ______Average  Range  directly  related  to  the  share  of  the  devel-
Development  cost Development  cost  lopment  costs borne by power companies.  A
All  customers  ($/mile)  ....  16,235  6,000-25,000  Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rs)  be-
Discounts available  to  tween the  proportion  of development  costs
interruptible power  usersa interruptibl  (powerent)r.s  8  0  -60  assumed by  the  EMC's and  number  of  mul-
Agricultural  (percent)  ......  38  - 60  tiphase  customers  was  estimated  from  the
aThe  responding  EMC's  offered  some  discounts  for  sample  data.
3 When  adjusted  for ties,  the rs
residential and agricultural customers.  No responses were  =  0.7417 (with Student's  t-statistic =  4.94)
given for industrial customers. There was no consistency  f  significant at the  0.00
among EMC's not charging construction costs and chargingound  to be significant at the  0.005
higher consumption  rates.  level.  This  rs coefficient  supports  the  view
2 Other  factors  which  might  influence  development  include  but  may  not be  limited  to:  (1)  the  number of
potential  multiphase  power customers,  (2)  the  income  of these  customers,  and  (3)  the  economic  potential  of
multiphase  power  availability.  Further  research  is  recommended  to  document  the  influence  of these  and  other
factors.
3 The  Spearman  correlation  coefficient  gives  a statistical  indication  of the  degree  of association between  two
variables. Spearman coefficients  take on values of -1  to +  1 where a value of -1  means perfect negative association
and a value of +1  means perfect positive  association.  For a further discussion of Spearman  coefficients,  see Siegal.
60that  multiphase  power  has  not been  devel-  such  an option.  A producer with a  200-acre
oped  in areas  where  customers bear  a  large  electric system could finance construction  of
proportion  of the  development  costs.  3.5  miles of multiphase  line without  an  in-
terruptible  service  option  and  3.8  miles of
EFFICIENCY  GAINS  FROM  line  with such  an  option.  If the  capital  in-
MULTIPHASE  POWER  vestment were  amortized  over  a  longer  pe-
riod than 7 years, annual capital requirements The impact of market failure in multiphase  would  be  lowered  and  the  breakeven  dis-
power development  can be  analyzed  by  es-  tances  in  Table  3  would  increase
timating  efficiency  gains  from  substituting  iure  resents  a  oteticl 
multiphase  power for diesel fuel  in agricul-  for  potential  users  of multiphase  power  as
tural irrigation  cost estimates.  For this analy-  irrigators.  Three  fields  that  are  topographi-
sis, 50-,  100-,  150-, and 200-acre center pivot  cally  suited  for center  pivot  type  irrigation
systems  were  considered.  Currently,  more  form the basic scenario for this example. Each
than  91  percent  of  these  systems  are  diesel  field  is owned  by a  different  individual  and
powered  (Skinner  1982a  and  1982b).  The  all  fields  are  served  by  an  EMC  that  offers
Oklahoma  State  Irrigation  Cost  Program  interruptible  service  and charges  customers
(Kletke  et al.)  was utilized  to calculate  op-  $16,235  per  mile  for multiphase  line  con-
erating  costs  for  the  systems.  A  break-even  struction.  A multiphase  line currently  exists
length  of multiphase  power line was  calcu-  6.6  miles  from  a  connection  point  to  field
lated  for  each  system  with  the  following  A,  4.4 miles from a similar point for field  B,
equation:  and  4.3 miles  from field  C.  These  distances
TCE  - TCD  were arbitrarily  chosen for the simplicity  of
(1)  BED  =  subsequent  calculations.  Fields A  and  C  are
MDC^/m~ile  200-acre  fields  while  field  B  is  a  150-acre
where:  field.  Individual  construction  costs  of  mul-
tiphase  power for  fields A,  B,  and  C  are  re- BED  =  break-even  distance,  spectively:  $107,151;  $71,434;  and $69,810.
TCE  =  total  annual  costs for  electricity,  The  location  of  each  field  with  respect  to TCD  =  total  annual  costs  for diesel,  and  the  existing  power  lines  prohibits  further
MDC  =  multiphase  development  cost.  electrical  development  since  ownership  of
The  development  cost  per  mile  utilized  in  the fields is partitioned among three individ-
the  analysis  was  $16,235,  which  was  the  uals  and  the  location  of  each  field exceeds
average  from  the survey,  Table  2.  the  breakeven  distances  calculated  in  Table
Results of this cost analysis are summarized  2.  In  the  absence  of subsidies  by the  EMC
in  Table  3.  Total  system  investment  ranges  or collective  action by the farmers,  the only
from  $56,468  for  a  50-acre  electric  system  viable  option  for  those  farmers  desiring  ir-
to  $90,504 for a  200-acre  diesel system. Po-  rigation  is  a  diesel powered  system.
tential  savings  of $2,787  per year  for  a  50-  The  absence  of development  is inefficient
acre  system,  $3,972  per year for a  100-acre  for the three fields  as a whole.  For example,
system,  $5,490  for  a  150-acre  system,  and  the  total  mileage  of lines  required  to serve
$8,026  for  a  200-acre  system  are  available  all three fields in Figure  2  is only 8.1  miles.
for  electric  power  users  without  an  inter-  The  total  breakeven  mileage  for  the  three
ruptible  service  option.  The  annual  savings  fields  without  interruptible  service  is  7.4
range  from  $3,059  to  $8,770  using  an  in-  miles. Potentially, if each of these individuals
terruptible  service  option.  With  these  sav-  were irrigating using electric power, $21,542
ings,  producers  could  finance  construction  in  total  annual  savings  would  result.4 Fur-
of 1.2 miles of multiphase  line for a  50-acre  thermore, through collective action these an-
system  and  1.7  miles of line for  a  100-acre  nual  savings  less  transaction  costs  would
system.  A producer with  a  150-acre  electric  finance  the entire line construction  expense
system could finance construction of 2.6 miles  in  2  years.
of multiphase  line without  an  interruptible  The  potential  savings  through  collective
service  option  and  2.8  miles  of  line  with  action must be contrasted to the transactions
4  A  total  annual  savings  of  $21,542  results  for  the  farmers  in  this  hypothetical  example  by  summing  the
appropriate  values  in  Table  2.  For  example,  annual savings  for  an  electrically  irrigated  150-acre  field  is  $5,470
and similar  savings  of $8,026 would  be realized for  each  200-acre  field.
61TABLE  3.  TOTAL  ANNUAL  OPERATING  COST  FOR  ELECTRIC  AND  DIESEL  CENTER  PIVOT  IRRIGATION  SYSTEMS  INCLUDING  AN  INTERRUPTIBLE  SERVICE  OPTION  IN  GEORGIA,  1981.
Field size  and system  type
50-acre  100-acre  150-acre  200-acre
Electric  Diesel  Electric  Diesel  Electric  Diesel  Electric  Diesel
· ·-  dollars
System  cost  .....................................................  56,468  61,602  75,308  82,469  77,145  84,158  82,645  90,504
Electric  intrafield  dev ............................................  ....  1,104  1,766  2,537  2,933
Total  field investment  ......................  .................................  57,572  61,602  77,074  82,469  79,682  84,158  85,578  90,504
Annual  fixed  costs
b .....................................................  6,906  7,389  9,314  9,965  9,561  10,099  10,269  10,860
Annual  variable  costsc  .. 4,639  -7,176  - 9,967  13,632
With  interruption  ...............................................  ......  2,063  - 3,314  - 4,430  - 5,453
Without  interruption  .....................................................  2,335  - 3,855  - 5,015  - 6,197
Total  annual  costsg ....................................-  12,028  -17,141  -20,066  24,492
With interruption  .............................................................  8,969  12,628  - 13,991  - 15,722
Without interruption  ........................................................  9,241  13,169  14,576  16,466
Annual savings
With interruption  ......................  ...............................  3,059  4,513  - 6,075  - 8,770
Without interruption  ........................................................  2,787  3,972  5,490  8,026
Breakeven  dev.  distance  miles
With  interruption  ................................................... 1.3  1.9  2.6  3.8
Without  interruption  ...................................................  1.2  14.7  2.4  3.5
a  Total  investment  costs  include all  development  costs required  of an adequately  sized well.  For the  electric systems,  the  total  investment  costs include  the  cost of
developing  the  electric  line from the  field edge to  the  center of the  field at  $1.50/foot.
b Fixed costs  include depreciation,  taxes,  insurance  and interest.  Purchase  costs  are amortized  over  7 years  at an  annual interest rate  of  10.5  percent.
c Variable  costs  include  fuel,  lubricants,  repairs,  and labor.  Fuel  costs are based  on  $0.043/KWH  for  electricity  and  a diesel  fuel  cost of  1.10/gallon.  The  cost of
electricity decreased to  0.027/KWH  using  an average  interruptible service  option.$6,000  per  mile  cost and  the  average  con-
struction cost for the cooperatives in the State
Field  A  would be  $10,235  which  could be  propor-
_200 acres  tionally  distributed among  the customers  of
the  EMC.  Subsequently,  the  breakeven  dis-
tances would increase to 7.1 miles for a  150-
acre  system  and  10.2  miles  for  a  200-acre
*^~~~  E  ~system.  In this situation, private development
N  is feasible  for  all fields.  However,  the  inci-
dence  of costs will  vary depending  on who
initiates the development. First,  consider the
150  acres  owner  of  field  A  financing  development  to
his  field.  The  owner  of field  B  could  then
.— I~~  _  install an electric irrigation  system receiving
j~~~~E -a  positive  externality  by paying  no installa-
tion  costs  and  the  owner  of field  C  would
Field  C  incur  a  construction  cost  of  only  $9,000.
- -li.5mi.-  200 acres  Since  this  charge  is less than  the amount  of
the entire construction,  a positive externality
.:*~~E  —also  exists  in  this  case.  Alternatively,  the
Xq  owner  of field  C  could finance  construction
iCV~~  ~to  his  field.  Similarly,  the owner  of fields A
,I'l~~  ~and  B  could finance  sequential  construction
Existing  Multiphase  Line  to their fields. In this case, each owner would
realize  savings.  Finally,  the owner of field  B
Figure 2. A Hypothetical Example of Market Failure  could  finance  the  construction  and  provide
in Multiphase  Electrical Development.  externalities  to  fields  A  and  C.  Only  if one
individual  owned  all fields  would  no exter-
nalities  arise. costs of collective action. For example, should
the owner  of field  A pay more  of the  devel-  SUPPLEMENTING  MULTIPHASE
opment costs because his field is farthest from  POWER  DEVELOPMENT
the existing  line? While such problems  may
be  resolved  with  private  bargaining  in  the  This  study  presented  evidence  of the  po-
example  in  Figure  2,  the  transaction  costs  tential  gains  from  developing  multiphase
for joint private action  would likely be pro-  power for agricultural irrigation.  When these
hibitive  for  a  group  of realistic  size  (Buch-  potential  gains  are  inhibited  by market  fail-
anan  and  Tullock;  Kafoglis  and  Cebula)  or  ure,  some  form of supplement  might hasten
where strategic  bargaining  is excessive.  This  the  development  of  multiphase  power.  A
research  did  not  attempt  to  systematically  summary  of the  legislative  provisions  gov-
measure  the  actual  transaction  costs  associ-  erning  Georgia  EMC's  is  helpful  in this  in-
ated with collective action  among  landown-  stitutional  analysis.
ers.  Instead,  this  research  hypothesized  that  Prior to July  1,  1981,  the EMC's were gov-
the lack of the development  and use of mul-  erned  by  the  Georgia  Electric  Membership
tiphase  electric  power  was  evidence  that  Corporations Act (Georgia Code,  1981). Sec-
transactions  costs  of  collective  action  may  tion 34B-310  specifically prohibited  electric
have  exceeded  potential  savings  (revenues)  suppliers  from  discriminating  against  or  in
from collective  action.  favor of any consumer within  a class of con-
One  method which  may  reduce  the  need  sumers  or  any  class  of  consumers.  Similar
for private bargaining  is subsidization of de-  provisions  in section 45-3-11  of the Georgia
velopment  by the EMC,  which appears to be  Code currently govern this requirement. Sec-
practical  in  some  cases.  To  illustrate  this  tion  34B-115  prescribed  certain  require-
possibility,  assume that the producers in Fig-  ments concerning rates, fees, rents, and other
ure 2  are served by an EMC  that pays  $6,000  charges  for  electric  energy,  facilities,  and
per  mile  for  power  line  construction  and  supplies furnished  by the EMCs.  Among  the
requires  its customers to pay all of this con-  more important requirements:  (1)  each EMC
struction expense.  The  savings  between  the  had to be operated without  fit  profit to its mem-
63bers,  (2)  receipts  had to be  sufficient to pay  be  in proportion  to taxes  paid, regardless of
all operating and maintenance  expenses,  and  potential  benefits  received from  multiphase
(3)  no  EMC  was  able  to accumulate  funds  power  development.5 Users  of  multiphase
or  maintain  any  reserves.  Section  46-3-340  power  could  earn  benefits  far  in  excess  of
of the  Georgia  Code  contains  the  first  two  their  tax  contributions.  Governmental  de-
requirements  and,  thus,  they  still  apply  to  velopment  of multiphase  power  to  circum-
EMCs.  In  addition,  EMCs  were  and  still  are  vent  market  failure  for  irrigation  users  may
subject  to  the  Public  Service  Commission  create  conditions  of non-market  failure  for
except  for  matters  that  would  fix  rates,  other taxpayers  who  pay  a  disproportionate
charges,  and service  rules and regulations.  share  of these costs.  This potential wide  di-
Several  of these  provisions  preclude  cer-  vergence  between the incidence of costs and
tain institutional responses to collective  fail-  benefits  might  make  this  alternative  politi-
ure.  The  prohibition  against  discriminatory  cally unpopular.
rates would preclude even approximating the  With  power  company  provision,  the  di-
theoretical solution in Figure  1. For example,  vergence between  the incidence  of cost and
different  development  costs  for  farmers  on  benefits may not be as great.  However,  there
the basis  of size  or type of irrigation  system  may be resistance from residential power users
or for crops grown under the system are  not  if power  companies  attempt  to  shift  devel-
legally  possible.  In addition,  the  provisions  opment  costs  to  residential  users.  Some  of
that  preclude  profits  and  accumulation  of  the  political  resistance  from  cross-subsidi-
capital  reserves  would  severely  hamper  fi-  zation  of multiphase  development  could be
nancing  the  development  by the  EMC  since  mitigated by evidence  of potential  industrial
equity capital would be unavailable. In 1981,  growthandrelatedemploymentinareaswith
this restriction was  modified when the Geor-  multiphase  power.
gia  General  Assembly  repealed  the  existing  The  final  alternative  would  involve  estab- gia  General  Assembly  repealed  the  existing
legislation. The new legislation,  The Georgia  lishment  of regional  irrigation  development
Membership  Corporation  Act  included  sev-  districts  to  internalize  development  exter-
eral  ne  proisions  eoria Code,  nalities and to manage the transactions  costs
eral  new provisions  (Georgia  Code,  1982).  of collective  active (Hawkins,  p. 93). Within
Section  46-3-340  currently  provides  the au-  each district, the development of multiphase
thority for EMC's  to accumulate  reserves  for  each d  ,  e  development of mltiphase power could be coordinated  by an irrigation
future capital needs or to establish and main-  cooperative  consisting of landowners  and/or
tain a reasonable capital structure. Therefore,  potential  users  of multiphase  power.  Using
power company provision  of services would  the  incidence  of  cost  and  benefit  criteria,
soon appear  feasible,.  irrigation  districts  may prove to be superior
to  government  or  company  funded  devel-
INSTITUTIONAL  ATERNATIVES  opment.  Since the  activities  of an irrigation
Possible  institutional  alternatives  to  sup-  district  would  affect  each  farmer in  propor-
plement  frustrated  markets  for  multiphase  tion  to  his  investment,  strong  incentives
power include government  provision, power  would exist for efficient and responsive  man-
company  provision,  and  irrigation  coopera-  agement  (Hawkins,  p.  93).  However,  some
tives. These alternatives address the problem  form of government  guaranteed  loans  might
of market  failure  by either:  (1)  shifting the  beneeded to assist the establishment of these
transactions  costs of collective  activity from  irrigation  crops.
potential multiphase users to the government  CONCL
or the EMC's or (2)  reducing the transactions
costs  of collective  activity  among  potential  Recent  agricultural  studies  have  focused
multiphase  users  through  new  institutional  on  rising  prices  and  unstable  supplies  of
arrangements.  The  distributional  conse-  energy; however,  the public good aspects  of
quences  of  these  institutional  alternatives  agricultural  energy  inputs have not been ad-
merit further  discussion.  dressed.  This  analysis  examined  the  devel-
Government provision would result in de-  opment  of  multiphase  electric  power  in  a
velopment  being  subsidized  by  the  general  public  good  context  using  information  ob-
taxpayer.  Contributions  by  taxpayers  would  tained  in  a  survey of Georgia  EMC's.
s The problem  of extracting  a price  (tax)  from each consumer of a nonrival  good according to benefits  received
is  described  by Randall  as  hyperexclusion  (p.  135).
64A theoretical explanation for market failure  construction  are limited,  its development  in
in multiphase  power development  and some  many  areas  has  suffered  from  a  failure  of
preliminary empirical  evidence  of such mar-  collective  action.
ket  failure  was  presented.  The  impacts  of  Institutional  arrangements  were  suggested
market failure were  measured by comparing  as possible alternatives for this market failure.
the  production  costs  savings  of three-phase  These were:  ()  government subsidized  con-
electric  power  to  diesel  fuel  for  irrigation.  strction,  (2)  multiphase  development  co-
Despite the apparent cost advantages  of mul-  operatives  that  increase  collective  activity, Despite the apparent cost advantages of mul-  and (3) subsidized construction by the power and (3)  subsidized construction by the power tiphase power,  its adoption  for irrigation has  companies.  Further  research  is needed reali-
been  slow in areas where  development  costs  tive  to  the  cost  and  consequences  of these
must  be  borne  by  power  consumers.  Since  market supplements to multiphase power de-
individual  investments  in multiphase  power  velopment.
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